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Two visual world eye-tracking experiments investigated anticipatory looks to implicit causes 
and implicit consequences in two clause sentences with mental state verbs (Stimulus-
Experiencer and Experiencer-Stimulus) in the first main clause, and an explicit cause or 
consequence in the second. The first experiment showed that, just as when all continuations 
are causes, people look early at the implicit cause, when all continuations are consequences 
they look early at the implicit consequence, for the same verbs. When causes and 
consequences are intermixed, people direct their looks at the cause or consequence on a trial-
by-trial basis depending of the connective (“because” or “and so”). Numerically, causes were 
favored overall, even when all the endings were consequences, but the effect was only 
significant at the end of the sentences in Experiment 2. The results are discussed in terms of 
rapid deployment of causal and consequential information implicit in mental state verbs, and 
in relation to conflicting accounts of why causes or consequences might generally be favored. 
 




• Listeners look early at (pictures of) implicit consequences, as they do with implicit 
causes. 
• When implicit causes and consequences are mixed, looks change on a trial-by-trial 
basis. 
• Numerically, very early looks tend to favor causes, not consequences, but this effect 
requires further investigation. 
  





Inference has long been a central topic in psycholinguistics (see, O’Brien, Cook, and 
Lorch, 2015, for a recent overview), and implicit causality is one phenomenon that has been 
extensively studied in relation to inference making (see, Garnham, 2001, Chapter 9 for a 
review of work to that date). Implicit causality is a property of interpersonal verbs (see, e.g., 
Hartshorne, 2014; Hartshorne, O’Donnell, & Tenenbaum, 2015, for recent evidence in favor 
of this view). When an eventuality (event or state) is described using such a verb, the cause of 
the eventuality appears to rest (or most likely rest) with one or other of the protagonists. For 
some verbs, such as “charm” and “annoy”, it is with the grammatical subject of a simple 
active declarative sentence and with other verbs, such as “respect” and “dread”, it is with the 
object. As Garnham (2001: 122) points out, implicit causality can be used in the process of 
establishing coherence relations between sentences and clauses, and in doing so can resolve 
indeterminacy in the reference of pronouns and other anaphors. More specifically, in (1) 
(1) John charmed Bill because he had an engaging manner. 
“because” signals one of a small number of relations between the eventualities in the two 
clauses (Effect-Cause being one of them), and general knowledge suggests that someone with 
an engaging manner is likely to charm rather than be charmed. So, in (1) everything fits 
together to suggest that it was John rather than Bill who had an engaging manner. In this 
example, the explicit cause is congruent with the implicit cause and, as many experiments 
have shown (see Garnham, 2001), processing is expedited in this case compared to cases in 
which implicit and explicit causes do not match, as in (2) 
(2) John charmed Bill because he was susceptible to flattery. 
From the point of view of inference making, the inference in (1) is that the person with the 
engaging manner is John (“he” = John, for short). In (2), the inference is that the person 
susceptible to flattery is Bill, the person being charmed (“he” = Bill). Implicit causality helps 




the inference in one case, but goes against it in the other. World knowledge wins out against 
implicit causality, but implicit causality affects processing. By the end of the sentence, the 
correct interpretation is (almost always) computed, with the effects of verb semantics and 
coherence, sometimes signaled by the conjunction, taken into account. Any theory of text 
comprehension must explain these facts. However, these end-of-sentence effects do not 
determine when the various sources of information have their effects on processing, a 
question that has come to the fore in the recent literature on implicit causality, as discussed 
below. 
In characterizing these inferences, we are taking account of the information in both 
clauses of the sentence. From the point of view of processing, this observation might suggest 
that the inferences are, or might best be, computed in a backwards direction, once the basic 
information about the eventualities in the two clauses has been established. Indeed, a major 
debate in the inference literature has been about whether inferences are made in a forwards or 
backwards direction, or, more generally about which inferences are made in which direction, 
and under what circumstances. 
One view is that inferences are only made in a backwards direction, at the point in a 
text where they are need to establish coherence (Corbett & Dosher, 1978; Dosher & Corbett, 
1982; Singer, 1980; Thorndyke, 1976). On this view there is a clear rationale for why the 
inferences are made – without them a coherent interpretation of the text cannot be 
established. And, as the implicit causality examples above indicate, it is relatively easy to 
characterize the content of inferences made in a backwards direction. Other accounts suggest 
that forward inferences, although sometimes made, are severely restricted. McKoon and 
Ratcliff’s (1992) Minimalist Hypothesis proposed that only inferences that are based on 
readily available information or that contribute to local coherence are made in a forward 
direction. Garnham (e.g., 2005) suggested that inferences based on the occurrence of single 




words might be made in a forward direction. As well as inferences based on gender 
stereotypes and reference into anaphoric islands, implicit causality information is generally 
thought to be associated with the occurrence of single verbs (see, e.g., the original discussion 
by Garvey & Caramazza, 1974, and the work by Hartshorne and colleagues, mentioned 
above), and so might be made in a forward direction. 
Despite this possibility, on the basis of empirical data from probe word experiments, 
Garnham, Traxler, Oakhill, & Gernsbacher (1996) concluded in favor of the Integration 
Account of the use of implicit causality information, which is a backwards inferencing 
account. In sentences such as (1) and (2) the congruity effects of implicit causality were only 
apparent at the end of the second clause, when information from the two clauses can be 
integrated. This account was also supported by data from the eye-tracking-while-reading 
paradigm (Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 2000). The only set of results prior to the visual 
world studies discussed below that suggested earlier use of implicit causality information 
(McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995) was susceptible to a strategic, task-based, explanation 
(McDonald, 1997), with no early effects in experiments where strategic prediction was not 
possible. 
In any case, the notion of forward inference is beset with two, interrelated, problems. 
The first, pointed out many times in the literature favoring only backwards inference making, 
is that, at any point in a text, many inferences are possible, perhaps indefinitely many, 
depending on how the inferences are characterized. Any particular inference is unlikely to be 
relevant to how the text actually develops. The other issue is that, without a final product of 
inference making – a coherent interpretation of a text, it can be difficult to characterize the 
content of an inference. Consider the case of implicit causality. The inference in (1) is 
something like “It was John who had an engaging manner”. That inference cannot, with any 
justification, be made simply when the verb “charmed” is encountered. So, we appear to be 




left with a vaguer notion, such as “Something about John, or something John did, is (likely) 
what charmed Bill” or, even: John is likely to be mentioned in the upcoming text, because he 
is the likely cause of the charming, and causes tend to be rementioned.  
It is perhaps for this reason that some researchers have turned to the notion of 
prediction, rather than forwards inference, in text comprehension, sometimes formalized in 
the framework of linear predictive coding as applied to brain functioning (e.g., Friston, 
2009). A prediction can be about any aspect of anticipated upcoming content, not necessarily 
an inference to a proposition or set of propositions. 
Returning to implicit causality, and to the question of when implicit causality 
information is used in processing, Garnham et al. (1996) contrasted the Integration Account 
with Focusing Accounts on which an implicit cause is immediately focused, for example 
when the verb “charmed” in (1) is processed, and hence implicit causality information has an 
effect before the point of information integration. Upcoming content that can be related to the 
focused (implicit) cause is then easier to process than content that is difficult to relate to that 
cause. Similarly, ambiguous content, such as a referentially indeterminate pronoun, might be 
more easily related to the implicit cause than to the other protagonist.  
In our previous discussion we characterized implicit causality as supporting or failing 
to support a coherence creating inference about which protagonist a pronoun refers to. A 
Focusing Account suggests that a referentially indeterminate pronoun would be considered, 
in the first instance, to refer to the implicit cause, even before disambiguating information 
(for example, at the end of the “because” clause in (1) or (2)) has been encountered. 
However, as this description makes clear, focusing is not, of itself, inference making. 
Despite the failure of Garnham et al. (1996), Stewart et al. (2000) and McDonald 
(1997 – where strategic processing was not possible) to find evidence for Early (focusing) 
effects of implicit causality, more recent, visual world eye-tracking, studies (Cozijn, 




Commandeur, Vonk, &, Noordman 2011; Itzhak & Baum, 2015; Järvikivi, van Gompel, & 
Hyönä, 2017; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010; van den Hoven & Ferstl, 2019), have shown that 
implicit causality information has an influence on processing earlier than the Integration 
Account suggests. In these studies, participants look preferentially at the picture of the 
implicit cause (compared to the other protagonist) while and immediately after they hear 
“because”, and before any (other) disambiguating information has been encountered. In 
addition, Pyykkönen and Järvikivi (2010) reported even earlier preferential looking, before 
the (Finnish equivalent of) “because”.  
Preferential looks to the implicit cause do not mean that an inference has been made, 
for example, the inference that Bill did something to cause the charming event, or even that 
“he” = Bill. They certainly do not mean that a specific cause has been inferred. And they do 
not determine the final interpretation of the sentence. They do however, indicate the early 
availability and use of implicit causality information. One possible interpretation is that a 
prediction has been made about the cause, or the probable cause, and that a continuation of 
the sentence in line with that prediction is easier to process that one that is not in line with the 
prediction. However, for our purposes, it is not crucial whether the focusing effect of implicit 
causality is best characterized as forward inferencing, prediction (possibly conceptualized as 
the use of Bayesian priors, Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2016), anticipation (Kuperberg & 
Jaeger, 2016), preparedness (Ferreira & Chantavarin, 2018), or as expediting later backwards 
fit with context (Norris, 1986). The crucial point is that implicit causality information is used 
before the point where full integration is possible. 
 Whatever the correct characterization, a complication arises, which illustrates the 
more general problem of identifying the relevant properties of discourse context that affect 
the processing of upcoming information. In addition to implicit causality, interpersonal verbs 
also possess the property of implicit consequentiality (Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 1998; 




see also Au, 1986), although it has been less extensively studied than implicit causality. 
Furthermore, Crinean and Garnham (2006) pointed out that the norming data collected by 
Stewart et al. showed that, for three of the four main classes of interpersonal verbs recognized 
by Au (1986), namely SE, ES, and AP (Stimulus-Experiencer; Experiencer-Stimulus; Agent-
Patient), the implicit cause and the implicit consequence1 are different, and these differences 
relate to the thematic roles associated with the verbs, which name the verb classes. For the 
fourth class (AE, Agent-Evocator verbs) implicit cause and implicit consequence are the 
same (the Evocator). So, corresponding to  (1) “John charmed Bill because he had an 
engaging manner”, in which the explicit and implicit causes match, in “John charmed Bill 
and so he was keen to continue the friendship” the implicit and explicit consequences match 
(“charm” is an SE verb, for which the implicit consequence is the Experiencer, Bill in this 
example). We note, again, that when these sentences end, they are (almost always) given the 
correct interpretation. Our question is when properties such as implicit causality and implicit 
consequentiality are used in comprehension and how they interact with the presence of 
connectives such as “because” and “and so”. The fact that two biases, with opposing 
tendencies, can be associated with the same statement (e.g., “John charmed Bill”) makes the 
question of particular interest, as we know from previous literature that both biases can affect 
both processing and final interpretation. 
In relation to Focusing, and on-line processing more generally, it is, therefore, unclear 
whether implicit causes should be focused, or implicit consequences,  both, or neither. We 
will consider a number of hypotheses in this paper. First, because both causes and 
consequences can be taken up in the following text, one possibility is that there is No 
Differential Focus on causes or consequences. Related to this idea is the possibility that 
causal effects in previous studies arise because all the sentences are about causes, and so the 
effects may reverse when all the sentences are about consequences (Strategic Focus). Second, 




in line with the original focusing account of implicit causality, formulated before the notion 
of implicit consequentiality was widely discussed, the Causal Focus theory claims that causes 
are focused over consequences. This temporal priority (in the history of psycholinguistic 
research) argument for Causal Focus is a weak one. Indeed, it is a non sequitur. However, 
other evidence potentially favors this theory. Children acquire “because” before “and so” 
(Bloom, et al., 1980), and this observation has informed theorizing on the processing of 
connectives by both children and adults (Sanders, Spooren, & Noordman, 1992; Spooren & 
Saunders, 2008). Additionally, Kehler et al. (2008, Experiment 3) provided empirical 
evidence that, for some types of verb with strong implicit causality biases, and in particular 
the mental state verbs used in the current studies, causes are highly favored in studies in 
which participants write continuations from sentence fragments such as “Tom disappointed 
Courtney” (over 50% of completions). Note, however, that sentence completions reflect final 
interpretations, and not on-line processing. 
Against the Causal Focus theory, general considerations about the development of 
narratives, a plausible location for the kinds of sentences used in studies of implicit causality 
and consequentiality, suggest a Consequential Focus theory, In particular, Moens and 
Steedman (1988) argued that, in narrative, there is a natural progression from an event to its 
consequences, suggesting that implicit consequences might be focused over implicit causes 
as they are more likely to be referred to again in the upcoming text. Both events and states 
can have consequences, so there are good reasons for considering a general Consequential 
Focus theory. However, in their own more detailed theoretical development, Moens and 
Steedman limit their claims to verbs describing events, because, they argue, only events have 
a semantic structure that shows how a focus on consequences might occur. Many 
interpersonal verbs with implicit causality biases, and in particular mental state verbs, are 
state verbs. Therefore, a Restricted Consequential Focus theory is compatible with a causal 




preference for mental state verbs, but a consequential focus for verbs denoting events. 
Stevenson, Crawley, and Kleinman (1994) present empirical support for Moens and 
Steedman’s proposal, in relation to both events and states.  
Returning again to on-line processing, if a cause is expected following the 
presentation of an interpersonal eventuality, then preferential looks to the implicit cause 
should be apparent in the visual world paradigm, even when a consequence is actually 
presented, and vice versa. Such effects, if they occurred, might be found  “Very Early” before 
any connective (“and so” signaling a consequence, or “because” signaling a cause) is 
encountered. Pyykkönen and Järvikivi (2010) reported Very Early Effects (before the 
connective) favoring causes in Finnish, though for sentences that always ended with causes. 
They also found an effect after the connective, but the design of the study did not allow any 
conclusion about a specific role for the connective (as opposed to just hearing more of the 
sentence). Cozijn et al. (2011) did not find evidence for Very Early Effects, only Early 
Effects, after the connective but before the disambiguating content. More recent studies either 
did not look for Very Early Effects (Järvikivi, van Gompel, & Hyönä, 2017), or did not find 
them (Itzhak & Baum, 2015; van den Hoven & Ferstl, 2019). Thus, the evidence for Very 
Early Effects is sparse, and cannot be regarded as definitive. 
We have, therefore, empirical evidence, from Cozijn et al. (2011) and Pyykkönen and 
Järvikivi (2010), for Early (at “because”), and less convincingly Very Early (before 
“because” in the Pyykkönen and Järvikivi study only), effects of implicit causality. These 
results support the idea that the implicit cause is focused. However, other considerations give 
reasons to think consequences might be focused, and even that, at least in narrative texts, 
consequences should be focused in preference to causes. Furthermore, a recent study by 
Grüter, Takeda, Rohde, & Schafer (2018) provided empirical evidence for Early, and indeed 
Very Early, looks to consequences, for transfer verbs in the case where there is no connective 




(e.g. “Donald brought Melissa a fancy drink. He/She obviously liked hosting parties.”), 
which disappeared when “brought” was replaced by “was bringing”. Transfer verbs are event 
verbs, but the imperfective aspect of “was bringing” indicates the lack of an endpoint for the 
event, and it is to the endpoint that the consequences would attach according to Moens and 
Steedman (1998). Grüter et al.’s results are, therefore, consistent with Moens and Steedman’s 
analysis. 
The studies in the present paper start from the observation that implicit causality 
information, with its well-established effects on final interpretation, can be used early in on-
line processing, rather than at the point of integration of information about the implicit cause 
and the explicit cause. More specifically, the studies address two issues. The first is whether 
implicit consequentiality information, which also has established effects on final 
interpretation, can have similar Early or even Very Early Effects to implicit causality. If so, 
the results of previous studies on implicit causality may depend on the materials used – 
sentences that always end by presenting an explicit cause (Strategic Focus). Our studies are 
of particular interest because the same verb has both an implicit causality bias and an implicit 
consequentiality bias, and these biases pull in opposite directions. The second question is 
whether causal information is prioritized, even when explicit causes are not, or are not 
always, presented (the Causal Focus hypothesis), or, alternatively, whether consequential 
information is prioritized, because of the typical structure of narrative (the Consequential 
Focus hypothesis, or a version thereof restricted to events – Restricted Consequential Focus). 
These theories make different predictions for on-line processing as measured in the visual 
world paradigm. 
Except for the recent Grüter et al. (2018) study, the visual world studies reported to 
date have all investigated implicit causality, and have not included sentences with 
consequence endings (Grüter et al.’s endings were not consequences, either, and their 




conclusions about consequentiality maybe be partly compromised by the fact that they tested 
on Source-Goal verbs). In our first study, we investigate the on-line effects of implicit 
consequentiality for mental state verbs. Our materials derive from a set that we originally 
developed for studies of implicit causality. Two such studies, with different types of 
comprehension question (Garnham, Hutton & Ivic, 2018), produced results similar to those of 
Cozijn et al. (2011). In both studies we found significant preferential looks to the implicit 
cause at and immediately following “because”, in a region with no other cues to the referent 
of the pronoun (Early Effect). In addition, given the apparent lack of any Very Early Effects, 
we performed Bayesian analyses on the effect of verb type (VBias: NP1 vs. NP2 implicit 
causality bias) on looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures in the region immediate before the 
“because” (which contained “padding” material, not the object NP), using the method of 
Dienes (2014). These analyses resulted in Bayes factors of less than one third, and hence 
provided evidence supporting the idea that there were no Very Early looks to the implicit 
cause. 
In the second study presented in this paper, which again focused on on-line 
processing, we pseudo-randomly intermixed sentences with causal and consequential 
endings, so that preferential looks could not be based on the fact that all endings were causal 
(or all consequential). 
If the Causal Focus hypothesis is true for the kind of verbs we tested, then early 
preferential looks to the consequence may not be found in study one, as preferential looks to 
the cause may dominate, at that point. However, if the pattern for consequences in the first 
study mirrors that for causes in previous research, that result will suggest that implicit causes 
and implicit consequences can behave in the same way, even if it reflects the fact that 
participants quickly find out that they are always presented with consequences (Strategic 
Focus). The second study will look to see if the preference for causes and consequences 




varies on a trial by trial basis, and hence is not strategic in the sense just discussed. It will 
also look for any overall preference for causes (Causal Focus) or consequences 




We developed a set of 84 visual stimuli for a larger set of experiments on implicit 
causality, using sentences similar to the ones used in the current studies. The sentences 
described interpersonal eventualities involving two anthropomorphized animals, which 
participants were asked to assume were always male and hence could be referred to as “he”. 
Each stimulus had four cartoon-like pictures, one in each of the four quarters of the screen 
(top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right). The pictures were one each of the two animals 
mentioned in the sentence, one of something referred to in the adverbial phrase that was 
added between the NP object of the main clause and the conjunction (“and so” or “because”), 
and one of an item not mentioned in the sentence. All images were selected from free 
uncopyrighted websites. The animals had neutral expressions, and were not carrying objects 
or performing any obvious action. The pictures did not contain any humans or other human-
like characters. Pairings of animals with similar names, such as “ant” and “anteater” or with 
the same initial phoneme, such as “pelican” and “puffin, were avoided, as were phonetic 
similarities between the animals’ names and the verb in the same sentence, such as “spooked” 
and “moose”. Because of the problem of finding readily identifiable pictures of a large 
number of animals, each animal was used twice, once in an NP1-biased sentence and once in 
an NP2-biased sentence. Within the set of 80 stimuli intended as experimental items (the 
other four were practice items), the positions of the NP1, NP2, Adverbial and Distractor 
images were balanced as closely as possible, using the 24 different layouts for the four types 








For the experiments reported in Garnham et al. (2018) we used a set of 32 verbs with 
strong implicit causality biases (16 NP1 biased and 16 NP2 biased). In other experiments 
with 40 NP1 and 40 NP2 verbs with varying bias strength, we failed to find a significant 
preferential looking effect. Each of the 32 verbs used by Garnham et al. (2018) was included 
in a sentence that consisted of a main clause and a subordinate clause, which were linked by 
the causal conjunction “because”. The main clause included two animal characters, a biasing 
past-tense transitive verb, taken from the list of 32 mentioned above, and a filler phrase or 
location (e.g. “The elephant disappointed the goat on the walk around the forest”). Following 
the causal conjunction, the subordinate clause began with the pronoun “he” which remained 
ambiguous given the instruction to treat the animal characters as male, followed by a long 
adverb, such as “obviously”, which was also uninformative as to the referent of the pronoun. 
Subsequent words were congruent with the bias of the verb and designed to disambiguate the 
interpretation of the pronoun in the intended direction. 
Because there are not many more than 16 common verbs of each bias type with strong 
measured biases (Ferstl, Garnham, & Manouilidou, 2011), for the present studies we decided 
to use 32 verbs in our experimental items, repeating each one twice in the second experiment. 
Because ES and SE verbs (mental state verbs) tend to show the clearest implicit causality 
biases, we decided to use only these verb types. Our starting point was the set of 32 verbs 
used in the earlier implicit causality studies, but these verbs were selected before the Ferstl et 
al. (2011) norming and categorization study was carried out. We, therefore, replaced some 
verbs that were not categorized as ES or SE in that study with ES or SE verbs as appropriate. 




The mean bias rating (percentage of congruent completions in a sentence completion task) for 
the 16 SE (NP1) verbs was 80% and for the 16 ES (NP2) verbs 87%.  
We rewrote some of the sentences from the original studies, where necessary, but 
always ensuring that the same visual stimulus could be used. We also had to write a 
consequential continuation for each sentence, that could directly replace the causal one. As 
the elements of the visual stimulus that were mentioned in the sentence were all mentioned in 
the first clause, the same visual stimulus could be used for the causal and the consequential 
version of the sentence. 
For Experiment 2, which required an additional 32 sentences, we selected visual 
stimuli from the remaining 52 from our larger set and wrote sentences appropriate for them. 
As previously mentioned, because of the rarity of common strongly biased verbs, and 
because we had not found preferential looking effects when verbs with weaker biases were 
included, we repeated each verb from the set of 32 used in Experiment 1, and wrote a new 
sentence around it, with both a causal and a consequential ending. 
All sentences were read aloud by the same male native speaker of British English to 
minimize differences in speech prosody. They were recorded in a soundproof room onto a 
MacBook computer using the built-in microphone. The sets of sentences for the two studies 
were read in separate sessions. Audacity 2.1.01 for Mac OS X was then used to edit and 
analyze the audio sentences. Analysis involved recording onset times for the sentence itself, 
the NP1, NP2, and the filler phrase, the conjunction (“because” or “and so”), the end of the 
adverb following the pronoun (the point at which disambiguating information began) and the 
total sentence length. Sentences were spoken naturally and hence varied from 5076 to 
7047ms in length. Audio files were imported into SR Research Experiment Builder software, 
which was used both to design and to implement the visual-world paradigm, and which 
provided precise and accurate audio playback. 





Experiment 1 examined the processing of sentences with consequential endings in the 
visual world paradigm. We investigated whether people who heard sentences that always had 
consequential endings showed preferential Early (at and immediately after the conjunction 
“and so”) or Very Early (before the conjunction) looks to the implicit consequence 
(Consequential Focus). In addition, we looked for any indication of looks to the implicit 
cause, which might be prioritized, if causes are more frequent or more salient than 
consequences after interpersonal verbs from the classes SE and ES (Causal Focus 
Hypothesis). 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 56 students and staff members from the 
University of Sussex (15 male, mean age 20.3 years, range 17-27), who received either 
course credits or payment for participation. Data from 15 participants were excluded from the 
analysis because those participants failed to answer 75% or more of the comprehension 
questions, one of which followed each sentence, correctly. Data from 41 participants were, 
therefore, included in the analyses reported below. 
 Materials. We used the set of 32 Stimulus-Experiencer and Experiencer-Stimulus 
verbs (16 NP1, SE; 16 NP2, ES) with strong biases chosen from the Ferstl et al. (2011) 
norms. The verbs were embedded in sentences that were recorded and paired with visual 
stimuli as described in the general Materials section. 
Apparatus. An EyeLink 1000 Eye-tracker (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada) was used 
to track the eye movements of participants. From the right eye a monocular recording was 
obtained with a sampling rate of 1000Hz (one sample every 1ms). The standard 9-point 
calibration and validation procedure and drift correction were part of the preparation for the 
study, and spatial accuracy better than 0.5 degrees was maintained throughout the study.  





The design had one factor, Bias of Verb (VBias: NP1 consequentiality vs NP2 
consequentiality), which varied within participants but between items. See below, under 
Results, for a description of the dependent variable, and of why Picture Looked At (NP1 vs 
NP2) was not a factor in the analysis. 
Procedure 
Participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form upon arrival. They 
sat around 50 cm from the computer screen of an Apple Macintosh computer running 
Windows XP. They rested their head on a chin-rest and their forehead on a forehead-rest. The 
eye tracker was positioned in front of and below the screen on the table. The eye-tracker was 
calibrated using a 9-point grid. The calibration was checked and drift corrected before each 
trial using a fixation point that appeared in the center of the screen. Once the drift correction 
was complete, and with the participant still focusing on the fixation point, the four images 
appeared on the screen and the audio playback began simultaneously. Because of the way the 
sentences were recorded, there was an average delay of 839msec before the beginning of the 
sentence was heard. Although the sentences were heard for various durations (5.1-7.0 
seconds), the images remained on screen for 10 seconds. Participants were told to use the 
images to aid their understanding of the spoken sentences, and so were encouraged to look 
around the screen at the images. Attention and comprehension were assessed through simple 
two choice questions, with the two animals as possible answers, which appeared on the 
screen two seconds after the offset of the images. The questions related to the content of the 
spoken sentence and hence 32 different questions were constructed; referring to the first 
clause, second clause or the filler phrase. Subjects received no feedback but were required to 
obtain at least 75% correct responses for their data to be included in analysis. After 
participants had responded using the ‘f’ (left choice) or ‘j’ (right choice) keys on the 




keyboard, a fixation point appeared in the center of the screen ready for the next trial. Four 
practice trials preceded the first experimental trial and the entire session lasted no longer than 
30 minutes. Once all 36 trials, including the practice trials, were complete, participants were 
verbally debriefed. 
Results 
The data were processed using SR Research’s DataViewer software (SR Research, 
Ottawa, Canada). Every 1 msec the computer had recorded whether the participant was 
looking at one of the four pictures, elsewhere on the screen, or off the screen. These data 
were aggregated into 20 msec bins, producing the proportion of time in each bin spent 
looking at each picture2. We focused on the data for the NP1 and NP2 pictures. Because a 
participant can only be looking at one picture at a time (or elsewhere in the visual world) the 
proportions of looks to the two pictures are partially interdependent, violating the 
assumptions of linear modelling. However, using a difference score measure, in our case the 
difference between the proportion of looks to NP1 and the proportion of looks to NP2 in the 
relevant time period for each trial (e.g., McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2009) eliminates 
interdependent data points. So, although, for ease of interpretation, we retain Picture Looked 
At in our tables and figures, our analyses are on difference scores3. 
For Very early effects (before the “and so”) we looked at data from the “padding” 
adverbial phrase at the end of the main clause. The average length of this phrase (up to the 
start of the conjunction) was 1689 msec and the minimum was 1330 msec. We re-referenced 
timing to the beginning of the adverbial on a trial-by-trial basis and, given that an eye-
movement takes around 200ms to plan and execute, we analyzed the period from 200 msec to 
1500 msec after the beginning of the adverbial phrase. The corresponding figures for the 
ambiguous first part of the “and so” clause were: 1433 msec average length and 1040 msec 
minimum; with 200-1200 msec after the “and so” analyzed. Although end-of-sentence effects 




were not the main focus of this study, we expected to find evidence at this point that the 
sentences had been interpreted correctly, reflected in looks at the picture of the referent of 
“he”, as the information from the two clauses of the sentence was integrated. From the 
“whole trial” plots in Figure 1 (see also Figure 4) it is clear that such effects lasted through 
the 10 sec period when the pictures remained on the screen. The latest point at which the 
ambiguous first part of the “and so” clause finished was 6520 msec into the 10 sec period for 
which the images were displayed. Allowing for the planning and execution of eye 
movements, we analyzed the period from 6720 msec into the trial to the end of the 10 
seconds for which the images were displayed. We did not go beyond the 10 secs because the 
abrupt change to the visual display at that point may have caused disruption to eye 
movements. 
Figure 1 About Here 
Analysis. As described above, the dependent variable in the analyses was the 
difference between the proportion of looks to the NP1 picture and the proportion of looks to 
the NP2 picture (DPLooks) in the time frame selected. If participants looked equally at the 
NP1 and NP2 pictures, the expected value of the DV was 0. We could, therefore, use the test 
on the (fixed effect) intercept to see if there were significantly more looks to NP1 or NP2. 
We focused on the NP1 and NP2 pictures only, as these pictures represented the implicit 
causes and consequences. We fitted linear mixed effects models to each data set using 
version 1.1-17 of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) for R3.5.1 (R 
Core Team, 2017), using the default REML method of estimation for initial model fitting, 
and ML estimation for model comparison. We set contrasts for factors to contr.sum (effect 
coding). We used version 3.0-1 of the lmerTest package (Kutnetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2015) to estimate approximate degrees of freedom, and hence p values, for tests 
of the fixed effects, using the Satterthwaite method. The fixed effect was Bias of Verb 




(VBias: NP1 vs NP2). For the mental state (SE and ES) verbs used in this study, a verb with 
NP1 consequentiality bias has NP2 causal bias, and vice versa. VBias varied within 
participants, but between materials. 
There is no universally agreed procedure for selecting an appropriate LMM to fit to a 
data set. In this paper we follow a procedure presented by Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen 
(2015), which is designed to temper certain problems with Barr et al.’s (2013) suggestion of 
trying to fit a maximal model, subject to certain constraints. With the relatively small data 
sets typical of psycholinguistic experiments, including those presented in this paper, and 
manipulations that are within participants, within items, or both, maximal models may have a 
relatively large number of parameters to estimate, given the number of data points in the data 
set, and the models may have unsatisfactory properties, partly because of the unstable nature 
of the estimates. In addition, some variance components may be estimated to be zero or very 
close to zero, because of the estimation procedure used in lme4 (see Bates et al., 2015). The 
Bates et al.’s procedure aims to eliminate random effects that either contribute little to 
explaining variance or, by using Principal Component Analysis (from the RePsychLing 
package, Bates et al., 2015), that are not independent of other random effects that contribute 
more to explaining variance.  
Very Early Effects. Table 1 and Figure 2 show the results for the Very Early Effect 
region. The fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ VBias + (1 | participant) + (1  | material) 
There was a highly significant effect of the Intercept, t(46.73) = 7.70, p < .001. 
Because the padding material comes directly after the NP2, there were considerably more 
looks to the picture of the NP2 in this region than to the picture of the NP1 (.384 vs. .186). As 
can be seen from Table 1, there was a numerical tendency to favor the cause over the 




consequence (.385 and .208 vs .382 and .163), but this tendency was not significant in the 
model we fitted – main effect of Vbias,  (t(30.33) = 1.17, p = .251). 
Table 1 and Figure 2 About Here 
Early Effects. Table 2 and Figure 3 show the results for the Early Effect region. The 
fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ VBias + (1 | participant) + (1  | material) 
The effect of VBias was significant, t(25.83) = 2.99, p < .01. As can be seen in Table 
2, even before disambiguating information about the actual consequence was heard, but 
during and after the processing of the consequential conjunction “and so” and the following 
adverb, there were more looks to the picture of the implicit consequence than to pictures of 
the implicit cause (.297 and .329 vs. .256 and .263). Subsidiary analyses showed that there 
were more looks to the NP1 picture for NP1 consequentiality biased verbs, t(14.09) = 2.04, p 
= .06 (two-tailed, though a directional prediction justifies a one-tailed test) and more looks to 
the NP2 picture for NP2 biased verbs, t(15.15) = 2.22, p < .05.  
Table 2 and Figure 3 About Here 
Late Effects. Late Effects of implicit consequentiality (and causality) were not the 
focus of this study, as they are to be expected on any theory at the point where a proper 
understanding of the sentence has been computed. Such effects are clear from Figures 1 (for 
Experiment 1) and 4 (for Experiment 2), and we report a statistical analysis of these effects 
for completeness. See also Table 3 (and Table 6 for Experiment 2) 
The fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ Vbias + (1 + Vbias | participant) + (1 | material) 
 
The effect of Vbias was significant (t(36.66)=4.77, p < .001), showing that 
consequences were looked at more than causes (.382 and .398 vs, .303 and .312) in this time 
period. Subsidiary analyses showed that there were more looks to the NP1 picture for NP1 




consequentiality biased verbs, t(19.23) = 2.88, p < .01and more looks to the NP2 picture for 
NP2 biased verbs, t(20.27) = 3.85, p < .001. 
Table 3 About Here 
Discussion 
In this experiment people listened to a set of sentences with interpersonal verbs in 
their main clauses, always followed by an explicit consequence in a following subordinate 
(“and so”) clause, and the explicit consequence was always congruent with the implicit 
consequence of the interpersonal verb. Under these circumstances we found clear evidence of 
Early looks to the implicit consequences, which varied according to the bias of the verb. By 
Early, we mean at the conjunction “and so”, a following referentially indeterminate pronoun 
(“he”), and an uninformative (about the referent of the pronoun) adverb are heard. These 
results parallel effects reported for implicit causality by Cozijn et al. (2011) and Pyykkönen 
& Järvikivi (2010) and our own earlier experiments (Garnham et al., 2018), where early looks 
to the Implicit cause were found. As expected, these effects continued to the end of the 
sentence, and indeed became more pronounced (see Figure 1) as the explicit statement of the 
consequence, which was always congruent with the implicit consequence, was revealed. For 
the verbs used in this experiment, the implicit consequence and the implicit cause are 
different, so looks at the implicit consequence are looks away from the implicit cause. 
We also looked for Very Early Effects, prior to the conjunction “and so”, before there 
was any explicit information that a consequence would be presented. However, since all 
sentences in this experiment did present explicit consequences, participants could have 
anticipated consequences on that basis. Nevertheless, we did not find evidence of Very Early 
anticipation of consequences. If anything, the numerical pattern suggested that causes were 
favored at this point, though the effect was not statistically significant in the model fitted by 
the procedure we had chosen to use a priori. The issue of the presence or absence of Very 




Early Effects, and their nature, therefore, remains unresolved. Cozijn et al. failed to find 
evidence of such effects in experiments in which all the continuations were causal. 
Pyykkönen & Järvikivi (2010) did report such effects, whereas in our own studies on 
causation (Garnham et al., 2018) Bayesian analyses provided evidence against such effects. 
Our results are compatible with the Strategic Focus hypothesis, but with a hint that the Causal 
Focus hypothesis is worthy of further investigation. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 examined the processing of sentences with both causal and 
consequential endings, pseudo-randomly intermixed, in the visual world paradigm. We 
investigated whether people who heard this pattern of sentences still showed preferential 
early looking to the cause or the consequence, or a trial by trial basis. We would expect such 
preferential looking at or after the conjunction (“because” or “and so”). Before that point it is 
not possible to know how the sentence will end. Any Very Early effect, before the 
conjunction, would have to reflect an overall bias towards causes (Causal Focus) or 
consequences (Consequential Focus). According to Kehler et al. (2008) and others, that might 
be to the cause. But general considerations about the progression of narratives suggests it 
could be the consequence. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 44 students and staff members from the 
University of Sussex (12 male, mean age 23.1 years, range 18-45), who received either 
course credits or payment for participation. Data from 4 participants were excluded from the 
analysis because those participants failed to answer 75% or more of the comprehension 
questions, one of which followed each sentence, correctly. Data from 40 participants were, 
therefore, included in the analyses reported below. 




Materials. We used the same set of 32 Stimulus-Experiencer and Experiencer-
Stimulus verbs (16 NP1, SE; 16NP2, ES) with strong biases in the Ferstl et al. (2011) norms 
as in Experiment 1. As described in the general Methods section, each verb was used twice, 
and embedded in two sentences, each of which had a causal and a consequential version.  
Design 
The design was a 2x2 with factors Type of Subordinate Clause (Conj: causal vs. 
consequential) and (causal) Bias of Verb (VBias: NP1 = NP1 causality/NP2consequentiality 
vs. NP2 = NP2 causality/NP1 consequentiality). Both factors were varied within participants. 
Conj varied within items, but VBias varied between items. There were two lists of stimuli. 
Each verb occurred once with a causal ending in each list and once with a consequential 
ending. If a verb in one of its two sentences occurred with a causal ending in one list, it 
occurred with a consequential ending in that sentence in the other list. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that there were 64 
experimental items, rather than 32. 
Results 
The data were processed using DataViewer as in Experiment 1.  
Again, we examined the sound files using Audacity 2.1.0. The average length of the 
adverbial, where Very Early effects might be detected, was 1670 msec and the minimum was 
1220 msec. We examined the data from 200 to 1400 msec after the beginning of the 
adverbial. The corresponding figures for the ambiguous first part of the second (“and so” or 
“because”) clause were: average length 1332 msec; 900 msec minimum. Data from 200-1100 




msec after the beginning of the conjunction were analyzed. LMMs were fitted in the same 
way as in Experiment 1. 
For Very Early effects, any favoring of causes or consequences would be apparent in 
the effect of VBias. If causes are favored, there will be more looks to NP1 for NP1 causally 
biased verbs, and more looks to NP2 for NP2 causally biased verbs. Because implicit causes 
and implicit consequences are different for these verbs the opposite pattern would indicate 
that consequences were favored. For this analysis we excluded the Conj factor, because, in 
the region of the sentence we analyzed, the conjunction had not yet been heard. The whole 
trial (10 sec) plot is shown in Figure 4. 
For Early effects, the crucial evidence comes from the Verb Bias (VBias: NP1 vs NP2 
causal bias = NP2 vs NP1 consequential bias) x Ending (Conj: “because” vs. “and so”) 
interaction. For NP1 causally biased verbs (NP2 consequential), there should be more looks 
to NP1 with causal endings and more looks to NP2 with consequential endings. The reverse 
pattern should be found for NP2 causally biased verbs.   
Figure 4 About Here 
Very Early Effects. Table 4 and Figure 5 show the results for the Very Early Effect 
region. Because this part of the sentence occurred before the conjunction (“because” or “and 
so”) had been heard, the factor Conj was omitted from this analysis. 
The fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ Vbias + (1 | participant) +  (1 | item) 
 
As in Experiment 1, there was a highly significant effect of the fixed effect intercept 
(t(44.85) = 5.72, p < .001). Because the padding material comes directly after the NP2, there 
were considerably more looks to the picture of the NP2 in this region than to the picture of 
the NP1 (.336 vs. .231). As can be seen from Table 4, there was again numerical tendency to 
favor the cause over the consequence (.243 and .344 vs .220 and .328), and in this case the 




tendency was marginally significant, two-tailed, t(125.34) = 1.81, p = .0732. The effect of 
Vbias on difference in proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 was -0.085 for NP1 causally 
biased verbs and -0.124 for NP2 biased verbs. 
Table 4 and Figure 5 About Here 
Early Effects. Table 5 and Figure 6 show the results for the Early Effect region. The 
fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ Vbias * Conj + (1 + Conj | participant) + (1 + Conj | material) 
 
 The only significant effect was the critical two-way interaction of VBias and Conj, 
(t(115.68) = 3.37, p < .01). As can be seen in Table 5, even before disambiguating 
information about the actual consequence was heard, but during and after the processing of 
the conjunction “because” or “and so”, the pronoun and the following adverb, there were 
more looks to the picture of the implicit cause than to pictures of the implicit consequence in 
causal continuations, t(61.58) = 2.38, p < .05, DPlooks ~ Vbias + (1 | participant) + (1 | 
material). The reverse was true for consequential continuations t(1239.00) = 2.47, p < .05, 
DPlooks ~ Vbias + (1 | participant). 
Table 5 and Figure 6 About Here 
Late Effects. Table 6 and Figure 4 show the results for the Late Effect region. The 
fitted model was: 
DPlooks ~ Vbias*Conj + (1 + Vbias:Conj | participant) + (1 | material) 
For this analysis, the participant random interaction effect has to be coded as 
dummy(Vbias):dummy(Conj), or the wrong model will be fitted.5 As in the analysis of the 
Early Effects, the two-way interaction of Vbias and Conj was significant (t(126.47)=7.65, p < 
.001), which, as can be seen from Table 6, arose from a preference for looking at cause when 
the conjunction was “because” (.237 and .229 vs .189 and .212) and for looking at the 
consequence when the conjunction was “and so” (.225 and .236 vs .215 and .192). There was 




also a main effect of Vbias (t(126.47) = 2.05, p < .05). This effect indicates a tendency to 
favor causes over consequences overall (i.e., independent of conjunction .359 vs .330), as did 
the corresponding effect in the Very Early analysis.  
Table 6 About Here 
Discussion 
In previous experiments (Cozijn et al, 2011; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010; Garnham 
et al., 2018 for causal endings; Experiment 1, above, for consequential endings) Early Looks 
to the cause or consequence (as appropriate) have been found. However, those findings might 
have reflected a general bias to look at causes (or consequences), given that participants were 
always hearing about causes (or consequences) – the Strategic Focus hypothesis. In this 
experiment, causes and consequences were interspersed in an unpredictable way, and yet 
participant’s eye movements were still determined (on a trial-by-trial basis) by whether they 
were hearing about a cause or a consequence, and by the causal or consequential bias of the 
verb. These results provide a clear indication that both implicit causality and implicit 
consequentiality information can be used early in on-line processing (i.e., earlier than 
suggested by Integration account), and on a trial-by-trial basis. 
This experiment also provided evidence that causes were favored over consequences, 
despite the fact that causes and consequences were equally represented – the Causal Focus 
hypothesis. However, this effect was only significant at the end of the sentence, where the 
end of the subordinate clause and its relation to the main clause were different in the causal 
and consequential conditions. There was some hint of a Very Early effect favoring causes, 
but it was not statistically significant. Given the varied evidence for Very Early effects in the 
literature (see above), such effects require investigating more thoroughly in more highly 
powered experiments. 





In the past the argument has been made that inferences in text comprehension are best 
made in a backwards direction. And in several domains, including that of implicit causality, 
there is empirical evidence that favors this view (Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000). 
However, there is also evidence from more recent visual world experiments (e.g., Cozijn et 
al., 2011; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010, and others) for the on-line availability of implicit 
causality information at a point before a precise backwards inference can be made (favoring 
the Causal Focus hypothesis). This availability could take the form of a full-blown forwards 
inference, a prediction or anticipation of what might occur in the upcoming text, or a 
representation of content that allows some types of upcoming information to be integrated 
more easily than others. Although it is well established that biases such as implicit causality 
affect comprehension, a potential problem for this set of findings is that interpersonal verbs, 
of the kind used in studies of implicit causality, have implicit consequences as well as 
implicit causes (Stewart et al., 1998). Furthermore, for certain common types of “two person” 
interpersonal verbs, and in particular mental state verbs, such as “astonish” and “admire”, the 
implicit cause and implicit consequence are different (Crinean & Garnham, 2006). Both 
biases affect the final interpretation of a sentence, so the question arises of how and when 
they affect on-line processing. The potential problem of both biases being in play together 
might be avoided if the effect of implicit causality is found only after the occurrence of a 
causal connective (“because” in English), as it is in the data of Cozijn et al.. However, an 
earlier occurrence, as reported by Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, is less easy to accommodate, 
because it is not clear why causes night be favored on-line over consequences without any 
information about whether a cause or a consequence will materialize. The problem becomes 
more acute when one considers that the natural progression in a narrative is from an event to 
its consequences (Moens & Steedman, 1988; Stevenson et al., 1994), so that one might 




expect the implicit consequence rather than the implicit cause to be mentioned in the 
upcoming text, where the two are different. Such a pattern of results would favor a 
Consequential Focus hypothesis. However, the specific proposal of Moens and Steedman 
limits this effect to events, not states, consistent with Restricted Consequential Focus. In any 
case, even if the effects of implicit causality and implicit consequentiality come into play 
only when just one of them is relevant (i.e., after a causal or consequential connective), and 
given that both are known to exert their influence by the end of the sentence, questions still 
remain about the time course of their effects, and whether one has an earlier or more 
pronounced effect than the other. 
A possible reason for the focus on causes in the visual world experiments mentioned 
above is that all the texts presented were about causes rather than consequences (the Strategic 
Focus hypothesis). No experiment to date has investigated the possible early availability of 
implicit consequentiality information or its relation to early availability of implicit causality 
information when both might be relevant. Another fact that needs to be taken into 
consideration is the empirical evidence that some types of interpersonal verbs, and in 
particular the Stimulus-Experiencer and Experiencer-Stimulus verbs that are commonly used 
in studies of implicit causality, are preferentially followed by causes, rather than other types 
of continuation, including consequences This pattern of preferences emerges, for example, in 
“off-line” sentence continuation studies (Kehler et al., 2008). This fact might, nevertheless, 
be consistent with the observations of Moens and Steedman, because their analysis applies to 
verbs describing events, whereas mental state verbs, as their name suggest, describe states.  
Experiment 1 in the current study was a visual world experiment in which 
consequences alone were presented. For comparability with our previous studies of implicit 
causality, we continued to use mental state verbs, which do have implicit consequences, but 
may not have the additional bias to consequences that Moens and Steedman identify for event 




verbs. In the second experiment in the current study both causes and consequences were 
presented, pseudo-randomly intermixed. In the first study we looked to see if consequences 
produce Early Effects in the same way as causes, and if so whether they produce effects only 
after a consequential connective (“and so”) or whether there are earlier (Very Early) effects 
when every sentence ends with an explicit consequence. We also considered the possibility, 
based on the observations of Kehler et al., that causes might be favored over consequences 
(in Very Early looks, and maybe even in Early looks) because of a general bias with verbs of 
this kind for causes to be expected, even though explicit causes never occurred in the 
experiment. 
In the second experiment, we looked to see if causes and consequences were favored 
on a trial-by-trial basis. As it was not possible to predict whether the ending would contain a 
cause or a consequence, any trial-by-trial effect could only be expected after the causal or 
consequential connective (“because” or “and so”) had been heard. We did find such an effect, 
indicating the rapid deployment of both implicit causality and implicit consequentiality 
information in on-line interpretation. However, as we have already pointed out, such effects 
do not necessarily indicate the use of that information to make specific forward inferences. 
Our primary focus in this paper was on Early Effects, in the subordinate clause, but 
before other disambiguating information had been encountered, because they have not 
previously been demonstrated for implicit consequentiality and mental state verbs. We 
presented Stimulus-Experiencer and Experiencer-Stimulus mental state verbs, which have 
different implicit causes (Stimuli) and implicit consequences (Experiencers). In Experiment 
1, we showed early effects of implicit consequentiality, parallel to those that we, and others, 
reported for implicit causality. These effects, of both causality and consequentiality, show 
that such information can be deployed early in on-line processing, because the cause or 
consequence varied pseudo-randomly from trial to trial, depending on whether the verb was 




NP1 causality biased (e.g. an SE verb, which is NP2 consequentiality biased) or NP2 causally 
biased (e.g. an ES verb, which is NP1 consequentiality biased). To the extent that results for 
implicit causality and implicit consequentiality parallel each other, they support the No 
Differential Focus hypothesis for causes or consequences. However, the results may depend 
to some extent on the fact that the sentences are always (explicitly) causal or consequential 
(the Strategic Focus hypothesis). In Experiment 2, we pseudo-randomly intermixed causal 
and consequential sentences and showed that Early effects still occurred on a trial-by-trial 
basis, immediately after the connective signaled the type of ending to the sentence – causal or 
consequential - ruling out a strategic explanation of the kind we considered (Strategic Focus). 
This information from the connective was combined with the causal or consequential bias of 
the main clause verb to determine preferential looks to the picture of the relevant NP. 
In addition to Early Effects, we also looked for Late (end of sentence) Effects, and 
Very Early Effects, before the conjunction had been heard. The basic Late Effects favoring 
the cause in causal continuations and the consequence in consequential continuations were 
clear and as expected, though they are not relevant to our main hypotheses because all viable 
theories claim that verb bias and information about the conjunction (and the details of the 
explicit cause or consequence) will be used at the latest by the end of the sentence to compute 
the correct interpretation of the sentence. An informative finding in the Late Effect regions 
was that, in Experiment 2, we saw evidence of an overall favoring of causes over 
consequences, giving some limited support to the Causal Focus hypothesis for mental state 
vers. 
Very Early Effects, which relate more directly to the Causal Focus and Consequential 
Focus hypotheses, are of interest, for two reasons. First, based on empirical observations by 
Kehler et al. (2008), causes might be favored over consequences in eventualities involving 
mental states, even though in narratives, where sentences of the kind we presented are likely 




to be encountered, there is a default tendency to move from events, but not necessarily states, 
to their consequences. Second, the previous literature has provided mixed evidence on 
whether such effects occur in on-line processing. 
Our experiments provided no clear evidence for Very Early Effects. In both studies 
there was a numerical tendency for causes to be favored over consequences (Causal Focus), 
even though no causal continuations were used in Experiment 1. However, in that study the 
crucial effect of VBias, which hinted at an advantage for causes, was not significant, and in 
Experiment 2, where there was a mixture of causes and consequences, it was only marginally 
significant. Further work is needed to investigate whether such effects are robust and, if so, 
what is their nature. Is there, for example, a general tendency to favor causes, or is any such 
tendency restricted to states rather than events. Our only clear evidence for a favoring of 
causes over consequences came at the end of the sentences. It will be important to establish, 
in further work, whether this effect is robust, and whether it varies with the kind of verb 
studied, again in particular (mental) state verbs vs. event verbs. 
In this context, another question that deserves further investigation is whether event 
verbs, to which Moens and Steedman’s (1988) analysis does apply, might show Very Early 
preferences for consequences rather than causes, as suggested by the results of Grűter et al. 
(2018) for transfer verbs. However, investigating this issue more generally may prove 
problematic, because event verbs tend not to have such strong implicit causality and implicit 
consequentiality biases as the state verbs used in the current studies. 
Conclusion 
We have shown that implicit consequentiality information, like implicit causality 
information, can be deployed early in on-line processing. This information allows listeners to 
focus on implicit consequences before it becomes clear how those implicit consequences 
relate to explicitly presented consequences. Since the same verbs, at least in the Stimulus-




Experiencer and Experiencer-Stimulus classes of mental state verbs that we studied, have 
different implicit causes and consequences, the on-line focusing mechanisms that we have 
uncovered rely on a trial-by-trial basis on sensitivity to detailed aspects of verb semantics, 
and sentential context, in particular the occurrence of causal or consequential connectives. 
The effects of implicit consequentiality occur both when all sentences end with explicit 
consequences, and when causal and consequential sentences are mixed. Furthermore, effects 
of implicit causality are also found in the latter case, indicating that different types of 
information are rapidly deployed on a sentence-by-sentence basis. We have also provided 
evidence that causes are favored overall for these mental state verbs (in the Late Effects) and 
have pointed out that the same may not be true of event verbs, which, therefore, deserve 
further study. The kind of focusing that emerges in these studies should not necessarily be 
equated with forward inference making and, indeed, we have provided reasons why it should 
not be so equated. So, although our results are incompatible with the idea that implicit 
causality and implicit consequentiality information are only used at the point of integrating 
information in full clauses, they leave open the possibility that what we call inferencing only 
occurs at that point. 
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1We note that the term “implicit consequence” is not as felicitous when applied to the 
person associated with the consequence, rather than the consequent action or state, as the 
term “implicit cause” used in a similar way. We will, however, adopt the convention of 
referring to this person as the implicit consequence. 
2Audacity® software is copyright © 1999-2018 Audacity Team. Web site: 
https://audacityteam.org/. It is free software distributed under the terms of the GNU General 
Public License. The name Audacity® is a registered trademark of Dominic Mazzoni. 
3The binning procedure is provided by SR research for processing data from Visual 
World experiments. The parameters are designed to produce significant data reduction 
without losing track of when an eye movement occurred. 
4In the difference score analysis, the intercept indicates whether there is an overall 
tendency to look at the NP1 or the NP2 pictures, and the Verb Bias main effect shows 
whether there are different tendencies to look at those pictures for NP1 biased and NP2 
biased verbs.  
 5There are several types of case where the dummy() function from lme4 has to be 
applied to factors in order to fit the correct model. See the discussion at 
https://github.com/lme4/lme4/issues/182 for the case of random slopes without random 
intercepts. The dummy() function is also needed, as in this case, when including random 
effect interaction terms without the corresponding main effects. It is also needed when fitting 
zero correlation random effect models with the || operator. 
 
  






Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures in the padding phrase before “and so” as a 
function of verb bias 
  Looks To  
  Picture of NP1 Picture of NP2  
Consequentiality 
Bias 
NP1 Bias .163 .385 .274 
NP2 Bias .208 .382 .295 
  .186 .384 .285 
  





Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures during and just after “and so” as a function 
of verb bias 
  Looks To  
  Picture of NP1 Picture of NP2  
Consequentiality 
Bias 
NP1 Bias .297 .256 .277 
NP2 Bias .263 .329 .296 
  .280 .293 .286 
  





Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures at the end of the period for which the 
pictures were on the screen as a function of verb bias 
  Looks To  
  Picture of NP1 Picture of NP2  
Consequentiality 
Bias 
NP1 Bias .382 .303 .342 
NP2 Bias .312 .398 .355 
  .347 .350 .349 
  





Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures during and just after “and so” or “because” 
as a function of verb bias and conjunction 
   Looks To  





“because” NP1 Bias  .316 .253 .284 
NP2 Bias  .283 .306 .294 
      
“and so” NP1 Bias  .287 .300 .294 
 NP2 Bias  .315 .256 .286 
      
   .300 .279 .217 
  





Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures in the padding phrase before “and so” as a 
function of verb bias  
  Looks To  
  Picture of NP1 Picture of NP2  
Causal Bias NP1 Bias .243 .328 .285 
NP2 Bias .220 .344 .282 
  .231 .336 .283 
  





Proportion of looks to NP1 and NP2 pictures at the end of the period for which the 
pictures were presented as a function of verb bias and conjunction 
   Looks To  





“because” NP1 Bias  .391 .287 .339 
NP2 Bias  .289 .409 .349 
      
“and so” NP1 Bias  .337 .372 .354 
 NP2 Bias  .393 .298 .3 
      
   .352 .341 .347 
  






Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins for the 10 
second period during which the images were on the screen in Experiment 1. Left-hand panel 
shows results for trials in which the verb had NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). 
Right-hand panel shows results for trials in which the verb had NP2 causal (NP1 
consequential bias). Analysis of Late Effects was for the period between the two vertical 
black/solid lines at 6720msec and 10000msec. The blue line at 839msecs indicates the 
average start time for the playing of the audio file containing the sentence. 
 
Figure 2 
Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins from 
200ms before the start, in the audio file, of the padding phrase at the end of the first clause 
(“PP”) to 800msec after the start of the phrase. Timing was resynchronized to the start of the 
padding phrase on a trial-by-trial basis. Left-hand panel shows results for trials in which the 
verb had NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). Right-hand panel shows results for trials 
in which the verb had NP2 causal (NP1 consequential bias). Analysis of Very Early Effects 
was for the period between the two vertical black/solid lines at 200msec and 1500msec after 
the start of the padding phrase. The red line at 0msecs indicates the start of the padding 
phrase in the audio file containing the sentence. 
 
Figure 3 
Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins from 
200ms before the start, in the audio file, of the conjunction (“and so” or “because”) to 
800msec after the start of the conjunction. Timing was resynchronized to the start of the 




conjunction on a trial-by-trial basis. Left-hand panel shows results for trials in which the verb 
had NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). Right-hand panel shows results for trials in 
which the verb had NP2 causal (NP1 consequential bias). Analysis of Early Effects was for 
the period between the two vertical black/solid lines at 200msec and 1200msec after the start 
of the conjunction. The red line at 0msecs indicates the start of the conjunction in the audio 
file containing the sentence. 
 
Figure 4 
Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins for the 10 
second period during which the images were on the screen in Experiment 2, Top row shows 
results for trials in which the verb had NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). Bottom row 
shows results for trials in which the verb had NP2 causal (NP1 consequential bias). Left 
column shows results for sentences with the conjunction “and so”. Right column shows 
results for sentences with the conjunction “because”. Analysis of Late Effects was for the 
period between the two vertical black/solid lines at 6720msec and 10000msec. The blue line 




Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins from 
200ms before the start, in the audio file, of the padding phrase at the end of the first clause 
(“PP”) to 800msec after the start of the phrase. Timing was resynchronized to the start of the 
padding phrase on a trial-by-trial basis. Top row shows results for trials in which the verb had 
NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). Bottom row shows results for trials in which the 
verb had NP2 causal (NP1 consequential bias). Left column shows results for sentences with 




the conjunction “and so”. Right column shows results for sentences with the conjunction 
“because”. Analysis of Very Early Effects was for the period between the two vertical 
black/solid lines at 200msec and 1400msec after the start of the padding phrase. The red line 
at 0msecs indicates the start of the padding phrase in the audio file containing the sentence. 
 
Figure 6 
Proportion of looks to each of the 4 pictures (NP1, NP2, PP, DIST) in 20msec bins from 
200ms before the start, in the audio file, of the conjunction (“and so” or “because”) to 
800msec after the start of the conjunction. Timing was resynchronized to the start of the 
conjunction on a trial-by-trial basis. Top row shows results for trials in which the verb had 
NP1 causal bias (NP2 consequential bias). Bottom row shows results for trials in which the 
verb had NP2 causal (NP1 consequential bias). Left column shows results for sentences with 
the conjunction “and so”. Right column shows results for sentences with the conjunction 
“because”. Analysis of Early Effects was for the period between the two vertical black/solid 
lines at 200msec and 1100msec after the start of the conjunction. The red line at 0msecs 
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